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The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law

FriedrichK.Juenger"

I. CONFLICTUAL1SM AND INTERNATIONAUSM

At first blush, the title of this article appears to be paradoxical because private
international law (a term used here in to connote choice-of-law rules applied to
international transactions) and the lex mercatoria' represent radically different
approaches to the same problem. Whereas private international law submits these
transactions to the law of a particular state or nation, the lex mercatoria,a concept
2
that connotes a set of transnational norms, would govern them directly, without the
intervention of choice-of-law rules. To link these divergent approaches with the
conjunctive "and" may look odd given the abyss that, in the opinion of
representatives of these two approaches, separates their respective schools of

thought.
There are, on the one side, the internationalists, such as the late Berthold
'4
Goldman3 and, on the other, the "conflictualists, such as the late Francis A.
5
Mann. The scholars found in one camp have little use for the views of those from
the other and sometimes mince no words when expressing their mutual disdain,
witness the following observation of the late comparativist Ren6 David:
[T]he lawyer's idea which aspires to submit international trade, in every
case, to one or more national systems of law is nothing but bluff. The
practical men have largely freed themselves from it, by means of standard
contracts and arbitration, and states will be abandoning neither sovereignty
nor prerogatives, if they open their eyes to reality and lend themselves to
6
the reconstruction of international law.

Copyright 2000, by Friedrich K. Juenger.
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University ofCalifornia at Davis. This contribution
to the special issue ofthe Louisiana Law Review dedicated to Dean Symeonides is based on a paper I
delivered, on November 5, 1999, at a conference on "International Uniform Commercial Law
Conventions, Lex Mercatoria and Unidroit Principle"organized by the Verona University School of
Law.
1. The literature on the emerging new law merchant is vast. For an introduction to the subject
and further references see Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1999);
Filip De Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria (1992); Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev'd ed. 1998).
2. On terminology see generally Berger, supra note 1, at 37-43.
3. For a succinct statement reflecting the fundamental views ofthe lex mercatoria's eminent
French advocate, see Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note I, at xvii.
4. A term coined by Rend David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5, 25 (1969).
5. For a succinct statement of his views see Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note I, at
xxiii.
6. David, supra note 4, at 212.
*
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No less scathingly, Mann rejected the notion of a non-national law merchant, saying
that the lex mercatoria"is as obscure as the equally unfortunate word 'transnational."' 7 These remarks suggest that private international law and the lex
mercatoria are incompatible notions, between which there cannot be any common
ground. How, indeed, should it be possible to reconcile the internationalists' idea
to submit transactions that transcend national frontiers to an overarching law
merchant, and the conflictualists' insistence that one or the other domestic law must
of needs govern because such a body of transnational law simply does not exist?
Wherever one's sympathies lie, however, neither of these two approaches is
indefensible and both of them have long been used in practice. The idea of a legal
order specifically designed for transfrontier transactions is the older one. It dates
back to the iusgentium developed by thepraetorperegrinus,who devised rules that
had a universal purport to govern disputes with and between non-Romans. s It can
ofcourse be argued that these were in fact domestic Roman rules, rather than some
kind of common law divorced from the society of which he was a functionary." The
ius gentium, however, not only differed from the ius civile used for purely domestic
consumption, but it also contained foreign (especially Greek) elements. °
Moreover, its rules were conceived for the express purpose of dealing with the
"transnational" transactions of the times, and it came to be considered as a natural
law, which could serve mankind at large." In fact, the idea that it represented a
universal law persisted over the centuries, as shown by the fact that the term ius
gentium was later used to connote both public and private international law.'
A lex mercatoriawith universal purport, which Maitland called the "'private
international law' ofthe Middle Ages," 3 developed after the Dark Ages, when trade
and commerce once again brought together merchants from many parts. The rules
that governed their transactions were not purely local in nature." Nor, however,
were they derived from the other supranational systems ofthe times, the revived ius
civile elaborated by law teachers in Upper Italy' 5 and the Catholic Church's canon
law. Rather, the emerging law merchant, which amounted to a "rebirth of the oldjus
gentium of the Mediterranean,"' 6 had to develop institutions, such as negotiable
7. Lax Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note 1,at xxiv.
8. See generally Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History
73-74, 81, 86(1966); Hans Julius Wolff, Roman Law 33, 72, 84 (1951).
9.

10.

SeeDeLy,supranote 1,at 10-11.

See Kunkel, supra note 8, at 73-74, 81, 86; Wolff, supra note 8, at 33, 72, 84; Franz

Wieacker, On the History of Supranational Systems of Commerce, in The Legal Organization of

Commerce and Its Relation to Social Conditions 7, 10 (1979).
11. G.Inst. 1.1; Cicero, De republica 3.12; De off. 3.17.69; De har. sep. 14.32; Sir Henry Maine,
Ancient Law 50 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed. 1906).
12. SeeScrimshirev. Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. 782,791 (Consist. 1752); Lukev. Lyde, 97 Eng.
Rep. 614, 617 (K.B. 1759); Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres: the translation (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1964)passim; Maine, supra note 11, at 50, 92-99.
13. Frederic William Maitland, Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts 133 (1889).
14. See Wieacker,supra note 10, at 11-12.
15. See Berger, supra note 1,at 54.
16. Munroe Smith, The Development of European Law 223 (1928).
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instruments, for which these legal systems offered no counterpart to deal with
the exigencies of commercial transactions that did not respect territorial
boundaries.

7

Maritime commerce, in particular, by its very nature called for

universal rules. In fact, to this day the international conventions that govern
this world-wide activity still reflect many of the rules maritime tribunals
elaborated, by means of the comparative method, from a wide variety of
sources as the Usatges of Barcelona, the R61es d'OIdron and the law of the
Hanse towns. 8 As these examples show, the idea of supranational norms of
commercial law developed through practice rather than legislation 9 is hardly
novel.
Once nation states emerged and the notion ofsovereignty spread, however, the
idea of a transcendental law lost appeal; the common law absorbed the lex
mercatoria and civil law countries nationalized it2 by putting its rules and
institutions between the covers of domestic commercial codes. Thus, while
recognizing the difference between ordinary local rules of private law and those
dealing with commerce-which, by its very nature, cannot be confined within a
particular territory-the codifiers, proceeding from the premise that commercial law
as well required the state's imprimatur, put a domestic stamp on rules and principles
derived frominternational practice, as did the English judiciary.1 Indeed, so strong
was the pull of the notion that only the state can make law that jurists doubted the
existence, or at least the legal character ofpublic international law, whose rules and
institutions were, after all, not enacted by a "sovereign." 22 Even those who accepted
that international law does amount to a legal system nevertheless took the position
that it was ultimately derived from the law-making power of nation states, whose
Individuals and
consent furnished the basis for its authoritative quality.'
enterprises, however, were not considered to be "subjects" ofinternational law; only
nation states could qualify as such.' In those positivistic times, the very idea of a
supranational lex mercatoriaor ius gentium to govern private transactions was
anathema because "ifit is assumed that law can only be made by nation-states, then
ofcourse it 'follows' that law cannot be made by communities that transcend nation
states."'25 Since private dealings, including commercial transactions, were not
17. On the law merchant of the Middle Ages see generally Harold J.Berman, Law and
Revolution: The Formation ofthe Western Legal Tradition 333-56 (1983); Leon E.Trakman, The Law
Merchant: The Evolution ofCommercial Law 7-21 (1983).
18. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 23 (1993) (with further
references).
19. See Roy Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millenium 11 (19.98).
20. See Uwe Blaurock, The Law ofInternational Commerce, inThe Unification ofInternational
Commercial Law 9, 13 (Franco Ferrari ed., 1998).
21. See Trakman, supra note 17, at 23-26.
22. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 208 (1st ed. 1832).
23. SeeGrigorii IvanovichTunkin, TheoryofInternational Law 89-203 (WilliamE. Butlertrans.,
1974).
24. See Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 240-43 (3d ed. 1999).
25. Harold J.Berman & Felix J.Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant and the "Old": Sources.
Content, and Legitimacy, in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note 1,at 53, 54.
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subject to public international law, they had to be controlled by the law of some
sovereign; the only question being which sovereign.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

To answer the question which domestic law should govern a particular
multistate transaction, courts and legislatures have looked to the writings of conflict
of laws scholars. Ironically, the glossators and commentators were the first to
discuss choice-of-law issues. Although their primary activity had been the
elaboration of a universal law, the ius commune that once prevailed
throughout continental Europe, these medieval jurists dealt with the subject
because they were of course familiar with the diversity of the legal rules and
institutions found in the statuta of the cities of Upper Italy, where they taught and
practiced.26 Building on their efforts, successive generations of authors from many
nations further developed and refined their contributions to the conflict of
laws."
The intricate problems posed by the attempt to deal with multistate activities
by applying domestic rules attracted some great legal scholars, such as Bartolus of
Sassoferrato,2" Friedrich Carl von Savigny"9 and Joseph Story.3 ° As might be
expected, not only the rules they advocated but also their fundamental approaches
to the choice-of-law problem differed considerably. Nor have these differences of
opinion been resolved. Thus, to this day it remains doubtful whether the statutist's
unilateralist approach-recently revived by American conflicts scholars such as
Brainerd Currie-which attempts to determine the spatial reach of substantive
rules,3 the multilateralist methodology Story 2 and Savigny3 3 advocated, or perhaps
an admixture of the two, is the most appropriate one to accomplish this delicate
task. Obviously, methodological uncertainties of this kind hardly serve the needs
of international commerce between enterprises that treasure certainty and
predictability in legal relationships. 4
The clash of different schools of thought is not the only problem with private
international law. Unilateralism as well as multilateralism are beset by a number of
inherent difficulties, which the proponents of these choice-of-law methodologies
have yet to resolve in a satisfactory fashion. I have discussed these conundrums
elsewhere;3" for present purposes it may suffice simply to refer to them. There is,
26. See Juenger, supra note 18, at 11.
27. For the evolution of conflict of laws doctrines see id at 11-21.
28. See id. at 13.
29. See id. at 34-40.
30. See id.
at 29-31.
31. See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict ofLaws (1963); Juenger, supra note 18,
at 98-103.
32. See Juenger, supra note 18, at 30.
33. See id. at 39.
34. Concerning the uncertainties of applying choice-of-law rules to international commercial
transactions see Berger, supra note 1, at 9-12.
35. See Juenger, supranote 18, at 86-87, 131-39.
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first of all, the multilateralists' "General Part"36 of the conflict of laws, which
contains an odd assortment of constructs as characterization, 37 renvoi,3s public
policy, 39 the preliminary (or "incidental") question' and other puzzles4' engendered
by the questionable premises on which multilateralism rests. Nor is unilateralism
immune to such self-inflicted difficulties. For the past thirty years, Currie's
followers have been discussing the oddities of "true" and "false conflicts,"4'2 the
"unprovided-for case" 43 and ddpecage" that their approach creates. In spite of all
the intellectual efforts wasted on dealing with the problems their methodologies
spawn (which have engendered a voluminous literature), neither of the two
schools can offer satisfactory answers to the simple question which law the
courts of different nations will actually apply to a particular international
transaction.
Both multilateralism and unilateralism reward forum shoppers by letting the
decision of transnational disputes hinge on where the dispute is litigated,45 which
frustrates the business community's quest for certainty and predictability in
commercial dealings. To be sure, it is the multilateralist school's objective to
safeguard these values. In fact, uniformity of decision was the rationale Savigny
offered to justify the multilateral system he advocated' and multilateralists still
pursue the elusive goal of "decisional harmony,"47 as it is usually called nowadays.'
But multilateral rules cannot possibly guarantee that the same law will be applied
irrespective ofwhere a dispute happens to be litigated. First of all, it is difficult to
localize in one state or another transactions that, by their very nature, transcend
national frontiers.48 What choice-of-law rules should, for instance, govern
copyright issues arising from Internet transmissions?49 To accomplish the
remarkable feat oftying down a transaction that straddles state lines to one territory
or another, multilateralists use the white magic of connecting factors. These,

36. See id. at 70-82.
37. See id. at 71-74.
38. See id. at 77-79.
39. See id. at 79-82.
40. See id. at 74-76.
41. See id. at 86.
42. See id. at 137-38.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 138-39.
45. See De Ly, supra note 1,at 58; Goode, supra note 19, at 87.
46. See 8 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen R6mischen Rechts 129; Juenger,
supra note 18, at 36, 39.
47. See, e.g., Pierre Mayer, Droit international priv6 56 (5th ed. 1994) ("harmonie des
dicisions"); Max Keller & Kurt Siehr, Allgemeine Lehren des intenationalen Privatrechts 57 (1986)
("Entscheidungsharmonie").
48. See De Ly, supra note 1,at 58. "[Typical international contracts are ab initio not localized
within any single national system." Blaurock, supra note 20, at 18.

49.

See Symeon C. Symeonides et al., Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, and Inter-

national 894-97 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of
Technological Change, 273 Collected Courses ofthe Hague Academy ofInternational Law 239, 322-98

(1998).
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however, have an arbitrary quality"0 and may unduly favor one of the parties by
3
invoking that party's home state law. '
Moreover, private international law rules differ widely from state to state, as
the variations between recent European conflicts codifications demonstrate, and the

"General Part" casts doubt on the actual effect ofapplying a particular choice-of-

law rule. Hence it cannot be predicted with any confidence what substantive law
52
will be held to control a given dispute; of necessity the rights and duties of the
parties to an international transaction depend on the forum that adjudicates them.
In practice, judges, after paying lip-service to the forum's conflicts rules, tend to
3
favor the application of domestic law. Assuming, however, that they, faithful to

their local conflicts rules, do venture to apply alien rules of decision, there is of

course no guaranty that they will apply them correctly' or that these rules resolve
5
the parties' dispute in a satisfactory manner. Even less apt to provide certainty,
predictability anduniformity of result than the traditional multilateral conflicts rules
is the unilateralist methodology, especially the current version that attempts to
derive solutions to choice-of-law problems from the "interests" states are said to

have in the applications oftheir laws.' That approach obviously favors the lexfori;

indeed, unilateralists have little use for the multilateralists' vaunted goal of
s
"decisional harmony." Worse yet, neither unilateralismnor multilateralism offers
any guarantee of just decisions in multistate cases.
The two methodologies do, however, have some things in common. Both

proceed from the assumption that courts are equally capable of applying domestic

and foreign law, an assumption that is hardly grounded in reality." Moreover, both
fail to address the fundamental question how domestic law can possibly be suitable
50. See De Ly, supra note l,at 58.
51. See Juenger, PrivateInternationalLaw and the German Legislature,in The International
Lawyer (FrcundesgabefrWulf H.Daser) 623,630-31 (1999) (the Rome Convention's "characteristic
performance" test).
52. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principlesof InternationalCommercial
ContractsPreparedby theInstitutefor the UnificationofPrivateLaw (UNIDROF7), in Transnational
Law in Commercial Legal Practice (Center for Transnational Law ed., 1999).
53. See De Ly, supra note l, at 57-58.
54. See infra notes 58 and 116.
55. See Barton S.Selden, Lex Mercatoria in Europeanand U.S. TradePractice: Time to Take
a Closer Look, 2 Ann. Survey Int'l Comp. L. I11, 114 (1995). As a noted conflicts scholar once
observed, "one who expects results in multistate cases that are... satisfying in terms ofstandards of
justice and of party acceptance is doomed to disappointment." Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Choiceof
Law and the Problemof Justice, 41 Law and Contemp. Probs. 27, 42 (Sept. 1977).
56. The existence of such"interests"may well be doubted. See Juenger, supranote 18, at 135-36.
57. See Symeon C. Symeonides, GeneralReport, in Private International Law at the End of the
20th Century: Progress or Regress? (Symeon C. Symeonides ed. 1999) (discussing Currie's discarding
the desideratum of international uniformity).
58. The judge's task becomes difficult ifhe is required to apply a foreign law, particularly
if it belongs to a "family" different from his own .... He is liable to distort it, if only
because he does not usuallyhave direct access to its sources, which are written in a language
not his own. There are many examples of this: for a national judge to apply foreign law is
difficult, haphazard, and not very satisfactory in any country.
David, supra note 4, at 11. See also infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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for transactions that transcend state and national frontiers. Shortly before the turn
ofthe century, when legal positivism reigned supreme and nationalist fervor had
reached its pinnacle, a Dutch conflicts scholar wrote:
It is an erroneous idea that private international law has attained its
objective when it has chosen from among the laws that touch upon a legal
relationship .... It is this idea which has converted our science into a
conflicts guillotine andhas produced these badly chosen questions that the
legislator can only resolve by a "sicjubeo." 9
Ren6 David voiced the same criticism, adding that the use of domestic tools to
solve questions that are essentially international "is to square the circle."'
Similarly, the Uruguayan private international law scholar Quintin Alfonsin
answered the question "can a nationalprivate law ... adequately regulate an
extranational relationship,"'" with a resounding "no," because the law adopted by
a state is designed to serve the needs of its society and can therefore not be applied
to transnational relationships, whose exigencies are different from national ones.62
Attacking the very foundation of private international law, he said:
From a scientific and an economic point of view it is inadmissible, in
effect, that the destiny of a contract should depend on whether it be
governed by the national laws of A or the national laws ofB, all the more
so if the selection between the two can only be made by reference to
63
imperfect criteria.
For this reason Alfonsin believed in an evolutionary process, which would lead
from choice-of-law rules to substantive solutions, so that transnational contracts
would ultimately be governed by transnational law."
Respectable authority supports the proposition that this stage has at long last
been reached. Noted scholars, in particular Berthold Goldman, have commented
on the emergence ofa new lex mercatoria," an evolution that is driven by the use
of standard contract terms in international commercial practice and the prevalence
ofarbitration. Because the members of arbitral tribunals owe no allegiance to any
particular nation, this method of dispute resolution allows enterprises effectively to
denationalize their dealings. It is therefore too late to argue that the exigencies of
international commerce are necessarily subordinate to the positive laws of nation
59. Daniel Josephus Jitta, La m6thode du droit international priv. 44 (1890) (translation by the
author).
60.
David, supra note 4, at 7.
61.
Quintfn Alfonsin, Teorla del Derecho Internacional Privado 19 (1955) (translation by
author).
62. Id.
63. Quinttn Alfonsin, R16gimen Internacional de los Contratos 171 (1950) (translation by the
author).
64.
d. at 179.
65. See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law--Lex
Mercatoria, in Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 113 (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1986);
Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note 1, at xix.
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states. "Unification and creation ofthe law on the transnational plane... reflect the
commercial realities ofmodern international business practice.... Legal theory has
to take account of this phenomenon in order to avoid any claims that it is out of
touch with reality ....'" The need for such a supranational kind of law can be
expected to increase as the volume ofinternational transactions keeps growing and
new developments put in question the traditionalists' preference for geography over
teleology. Phenomena such as "cyberspace," which are at odds with the traditionalby fixed borders,
ists' conception of the world as legal territories surrounded
67
suggest the usefulness ofa law that knows no bourndaries
III. INTERNATIONAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES INCURRENT PRACTICE

As one might expect, conflicts schiolars who are imbued with traditional notions
of sovereignty and legal positivism have sharply criticized the opinions of
internationalists.6 One oftheir arguments, the lex mercatoria'salleged dearth of
rules, has lost cogency. The uniform commercial law of our times includes, inter
alia, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of

Goods (Vienna Convention),69 a set of positive norms, and the70UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, a "restatement." While the
former is limited to sales transactions, the latter-the work product of eminent
scholars from both of the two major legal cultures, the common and the civil
law-amounts to a broadly gauged code of contract law. As far as both quality and
coverage are concerned, the UNIDROIT Principles compare favorably with the
domestic laws of most states and nations; in fact, it seems fair to say that they are
superior in many respects to, for instance, the contracts provisions ofthe German
72
Civil Code.7 A mere restatement, they are not burdened by the compromises that
inevitably mar the final product when negotiators insist on protecting what they may
3
believe to be national interests. In addition to these international endeavors to
66. Berger, supra note 1,at 230.
67. See Symeonides et al., supra note 49, at 894-87; Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 376-98.
68. See, e.g., Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la lex mercatoria, in Le droit des relations
dconomiques intemationales125 (1982); Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First
Twenty-Five Years, in Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce 149 (Maarten Bos & Ian
Brownlie eds., 1987).
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1988), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980), reprintedin 15 U.S.C. 333
69. Apr. 11,

(1997).

70. 34 I.L.M.1067; see generally Michael Joachim Bonell, An International Restatement of
Contract Law (2d ed. 1997).
71. For critical comments on various deficiencies of,for instance, the rules on breach of contract
found in the German Bolrgerliches Gesetzbuch see, e.g., I B. S.Markesinis et al., The Law of Contracts
and Restitution: A Comparative Introduction 398-401 (1997); Konrad Zweigert & Hein Koetz,
Einflhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung 486, 511-12 (impossibility), 492, 509, 511 (breach) (3d ed.
1996). See also Zweigert & Kdtz, id. at 513-15 for abriefcomparative reference to the U.N. Convention
on the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles.
72. See Bonell, supra note 70, at 63-65.
73. "[E]very international convention represents but the sum of compromises that the
representatives of different legal, political and economic systems were able to achieve. Because,
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codify rules, there have been attempts to
list the pertinent principles oftransnational
74
commercial law observed in practice.
Thus there now exists a body of rules that, having a supranational purport, is
better suited to deal with international transactions than choice-of-law rules possibly
could. To be sure, private international law, at least its multilateral variant, does
have some supranational features, even though its rules are of national origin.
Because of a shared academic tradition-which, through Story, also spread to the
common law"--it contains a number of universal ideas, or at least ideas that are
recognized in several nations.' Specifically, as far contracts, the lifeblood of

international commerce, are concerned, most civilized nations have long recognized
that the parties to an agreement are free to stipulate the law they wish to govern
their respective rights and duties. The principle of party autonomy is now firmly
established in the laws ofall developed countries and has acquired true international
stature by having been enshrined in choice-of-law conventions."'
Significantly, party autonomy has troubled quite a few "conflictualists" because
that principle cannot be readily explained in terms of either unilateralism or
multilateralism, s as the reaction ofscholars from both ofthese two schools shows.
Multilateralists such as Ludwig von Bar 9 and Beale" rejected it, Batiffol attempted
to explain it away,"' and Kegel calls it a "Verlegenheitsl6sung."s2 Preoccupied with
notions of sovereignty and state interests, unilateralists such as Currie find it
difficult to understand how the concerns of private parties could possibly trump
those of states.83 Party autonomy of course echoes, on the level of private
international law, the fundamental substantive principle offreedom of contract. It
however, there are always issues for which a compromise cannot be found, gaps are unavoidable."
Franco Ferrari,Das Verhflitnis zwischen den Unidroit-Grundsdtzen und den allgemeinen Grundsatzen
internationaler Einheitsprivarechtskonventionen, 53 Juristenzeitungl0 (1998) (translation by the
author).
74. See Berger, supra note 1,at 208-29. For such a list see id. at 278.
75. See Juenger, supra note 18, at 29.
76. [T]here has always been acommon conceptual framework in European conflicts theory
including the United Kingdom. Concepts like classification, preliminary question, renvoi,
evasion of law and public policy are common ground in all European legal systems....
There are no impediments to a ius ommune in private international law.
Bemd von Hoffmann, The European Community and Private InternationalLaw, in European Private
International Law 15 (Bemd von Hoffmann ed., 1998). The list of international commercial law
principles in Berger, supranote I, at 278 contains several choice-of-law principles. See rules 26-28 id.
at 289-90; see also Klaus Peter Berger, The CENTRAL-List ofPrinciples, Rules and Standards ofthe
Lex Mercatoria, in Transnational Law in Commercial Legal Practice 121 (Center for Transnational Law
ed., 1999).
77. See id. at 27-29; Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice ofLaw in the Americas, 45 Am. J.
Comp.L. 195, 200, 204 (1997).
78. Concerning problems the traditional approach has with party autonomy see De Ly,supra note
1,at 63-74.
79. See 2 Ludwig von Bar, Intemationales Privatrecht 3-5 (1889).
80. See 2 Joseph H. Beale, The Conflict of Laws 1079-86, 1091 (1935).
81. See Henri Batiffol, Les conflits de lois en mati6re de contrats 340 (1938).
82. Gerhard Kegel, Intemationales Privatrecht 483 (7th ed. 1995) ("Verlegenheitsldsung").
83. See Currie, supra note 31, at 103 ("subversion ofthe interest of the state").
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offers an eminently practical solution to the choice-of-law quandary by enabling
individuals and enterprises to submit their transactions to a legal order that can
accommodate the needs of international commerce. Hence it makes sense, for
instance, to specify the application of English law in commercial cases (which
foreign parties often do even if their contract has no contact whatsoever with the
United Kingdom)."
Notwithstanding the vital function party autonomy serves in international
commerce, some "conflictualists," preoccupied with the tenets of sovereignty and
legal positivism, have tried to limit the parties' choice to a selection from among
3 of the
positive laws. Thus, according to Paul Lagarde, one of its reporters, article
85
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations does not
authorize individuals and enterprises to designate the lex mercatoria, the
UNIDROIT Principles or any other non-positive legal system,as the law that is to
govern their agreement." Whether the European courts will actually construe the
7
Rome Convention in such a restrictive fashion is questionable; Icertainly know
of no case that has so held. Yet, the fetters with which "conflictualists" attempt to
adorn the universal principle-whose ultimate justification is its responsiveness to
the needs of international commerce-is revealing: it cogently demonstrates the
inclination of traditional private international law scholars to relegate felt
necessities to a low priority on their scale ofvalues.
IV. Is THERE AROLE FOR THE LEXMERATORIA IN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Irrespective of how unsatisfactory it may be, however, as matters stand now,
any rumors of a demise of "conflictualism" would be highly exaggerated. Bad
habits die hard; for the foreseeable future private international law--enshrined as
it is in domestic legislation and international conventions--can be expected to
remain the preferred approach to dealing with international transactions. This fact
inevitably poses the question whether private international law and universalism
must forever remain at loggerheads, or whether there is room for coexistence, and perhaps some form of interaction, between the two schools of
thought.
A. JusticeStory andthe Lex Mercatoria

Luckily, not all ofus who teach private international law are entirely averse to
the lex mercatoria. I certainly have been impressed by the arguments of those who
84. See Goode, supranote 19, at 94.
85. European Convention of June 19,1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
1980 O.J. (L 266) i, reprinted in 19 l.L.M. 1492 (1980).
86. Paul Lagarde, Le nouveau droit internationalpriv6 des contrats apras 1'entrdeen vigeur de
la Convention de Rome du 19juin 1980, 80 Revue critique de droit international prive 287, 300-01
(1991).

87.

See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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look favorably upon the new law merchant."8 Nor am I the only one. 9 In fact,
Justice Story-who coined the term "private international law" -- was a firm

believer in the existence of a supranational law of commerce, as shown by his
opinion in Swift v. Tyson.9 In that case, which dealt with the issue whether the
endorsement ofa negotiable instrument was void because it lacked consideration
pursuant to New York case law, he said that "the true interpretation of [contracts
and other commercial instruments] are to be sought, not in the decisions ofthe local
tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial
jurisprudence."' For this proposition he relied on an opinion in an admiralty case
by Lord Mansfield (one ofwhose accomplishments was the incorporation ofthe law
merchant into English common law), which quoted Cicero's observation about the
ius gentium.93 In Swift, Story used the same quotation: "Non eritalia lex Romae,
alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore,
'
una eademque lex obtinebit."94

Of course, the eminent American judge and scholar penned his opinion before
the old lex mercatoriawas nationalized; once legal positivism became rampant,
Swift v. Tyson came under attack. Justice Holmes debunked this precedent, saying
that "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it"95 and "the authority and only authority is the State,""
a passage on which Justice Brandeis relied in ErieR.R. v. Tompkins,' the decision
that overruled Swift. The consequences ofthe doctrine the Supreme Court adopted
88. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoriaand the Conflict ofLaws, in Lex Mercatoria
and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 265; Friedrich K. Jienger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the
New Law Merchant, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 487 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, Lex Mercatoria und
Eingriffsnormen, in Festschrift fir Fritz Rittner 233 (1991).
89. Alfonsin, see supra note 61 and accompanying text, as well as Josephus Jitta, see supra note
59 and accompanying text, taught private international law. For favorable views of contemporary
teachers of private international law see, e.g., Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoriain International
CommercialArbitration,34 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 747 (1985); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria:
An Arbitrator's View, in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, supra note I, at 71. Echoing the earlier
authors' concerns, Lowenfeld wrote:
Lex mercatoria, as I see it, can furnish an alternative to a conflict of laws search which is
often artificial and inconclusive, and a way out ofapplying rules that are inconsistent with
the needs and usages of international commerce and which were adopted by individual
states with internal, not international transactions in mind.
Id.at 85.
90. See Joseph H. Story, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws I1 (2d ed. 1841).
91. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,58 S. Ct. 817
(1938).
92. Swyi,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
93. See Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (1759).
94. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19. Earlier, Story had used a slightly different version of this
quotation in an admiralty case, De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418,443 (C.C. D. Mass. 1815), in which he
referred to the "great system ofmaritime law."
95. Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab &Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533, 48 S. Ct. 404, 409 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 535, 48 S.Ct. at 409.
97. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79, 58 S. Ct. 817, 823 (1938).
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in Erie illustrate the hazards of "conflictualism." That case has helped balkanize
American law and prompted innumerable choice-of-law problems, especially in
mass disaster cases. The difficulties it created induced Judge Weinstein, the eminent
judge and scholar, to revive-in the Agent Orange98 litigation-the rule in Swift
under the guise of a "national consensus law."" This bold move had the purpose
ofpromoting an acceptable outcome ofthe staggering number oflawsuits brought
for injuries armed services personnel had suffered on account of the defoliants
sprayed on enemy territory during the Vietnam war. As this case shows, an
overarching law designed to take into account international realities is apt to
produce more sensible and practical solutions than the conflictualists' insistence
on the need to invoke domestic laws to dispose ofdisputes that, by their very nature,
are not confined to the borders of a single state.
B. PartyAutonomy and the UNIDROITPrinciples

While it may appear that private international law and the lex mercatoriaare
simply incompatible, on reflection it becomes apparent that there is room for coexistence; the new law merchant can in fact interact with choice-of-law principles.
First of all, at least some private international law scholars take the position that
party autonomy ought to enable individuals and enterprises to submit their
international dealings to supranational law or the UNIDROIT Principles.) Few
would deny that such a choice is possible whenever a contract provides for
arbitrating rather than litigating future disputes that may arise between the parties.
In fact, if the parties should have failed to do so (and sometimes even ifthey select
a national law to govern their agreement), arbitrators have been known nevertheless
to invoke rules and institutions derived from the lex mercatoriaand the UNIDROIT
Principles."0 ' The argument that they thereby violated their mandate and acted as
mere amiable compositeurs without the parties' consent has been rejected in a
number ofreported cases.° 2 Moreover, countless important transactions are already
governed by non-national rules such as the Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce and the
INCOTERMS.' °3
98. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y.1984).
99. See id. at 696-99, 708,709, 711-13.
100. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
101. For references see B. Fauvarque-Cosson, in A New Approach to International Commercial
Contracts 95, 114 (1999). A U.S. federal district court enforced an arbitral award that invoked the
UNIDROIT Principles notwithstanding a choice-of-law clause that provided for the application of
Iranian law. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic defense Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (S.D. Cal.
1998). For a discussion of this case see Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROITPrinciples:A Significant
Recognition by a UnitedStates District Court, 4 Uniform L. Rev. 651 (1999).
102. For pertinent national court decisions seesupra,Berger, note I, at 85 n.353; Blaurock, supra
note 20, at 23-24.
103. See supraBerger, note I, at 67-68, 226-27; Arthur 1. Rosett, The UNIDROITPrinciplesof
International Commercial Contracts: A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, 46
Am. J. Comp. L. 347, 352-53 (Supp. 1998).
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Because of their preoccupation with "sources,"'" however, die-hard
conflictualists object to allowing contractual stipulations that invoke non-positive
rules.0 5 For this reason, the Rome Convention has been worded in such a way as
not to permitthe parties to submit their agreement to the UNIDROIT Principles or
the lex mercatoria." Whether the Convention will in fact be interpreted to restrict
the freedom of individuals and enterprises engaged in international transactions to
7
select whatever law they like, be it national or supranational, remains doubtful."
If the drafters, however, should have succeeded in imposing such a nonsensical
s
restraint-for no other reason than to safeguard doctrinal purity' -they would
have rendered a disservice to the European Union. The prohibition against the
selection of non-national norms deprives enterprises of a valuable option, which
in practice can serve the important function to overcome a deadlock by stipulating
to a neutral law. Moreover, it inhibits courts from filling gaps of international
conventions by recourse to the UNIDROIT Principles or other supranational bodies
of law.' 9 Unable to invoke to rules specifically developed for international
jeopardizing the convenrealities, courts must then resort to national law, thereby
0
law.1
uniform
a
creating
of
objective
tions' very
This will not do at a time when "we find commercial practice in a period of
change unprecedented in its pace and scale.'' However, a remedy is at hand.
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the Treaty of Rome to include the
harmonization of conflicts rules among the tasks assigned to the European
Community, it now allows for "supranationalizing" the choice-of-law rules
contained in the Rome Convention by substituting a regulation for this compact."'
104. "[The lex mercatoria-doctrine constitutes a veritable threat to the classical theory of legal
at 29. As to that theory see Peter Berger, EinheitlicheRechtsstrukturen
sources." Berger, supranote 1,
durch auflergesetzlicheRechtsvereinheitllichung,54 Juristenzeitung 369, 371-72 (1999).
105. "Among [the general] ... principles [of private international law] is the Magna Chartaof

conflict of laws which states that domestic courts may not apply a-national law." Berger, supra note I,
at 78.
106. See supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text.
107. The view of legal authors differ widely. See, e.g., Christoph Reithman & Dieter Martiny,

Internationales Vertragsrecht 62-63 (5th ed. 1996); Katharina Boele-Woelki, The UNIDROIT
Principles ofInternationalCommercialContractsand the PrinciplesofEuropeanContractLaw: How
toApply Them to InternationalContracts,I Uniform L. Rev. 652,664-66 (1996); Bernard Dutoit, The
Rome Convention on the Choice ofLaw ForContracts,in European Private International Law, supra

note 76, at 39, 44-45; Ferrari, supra note 73, at 15, 17; Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und

Privatkodifikation,62 RabelsZ 580, 596-98 (1998); Johannes Christian Wichard, DieAnwendungder
UNIDROIT-Prinzipienfir internationaleHandelsvertriage durch Schiedsgerichte und staatliche

Gerichte, 60 RabelsZ 269, 282-90 (1996).
108. See Lagarde, supra note 86, at 300-01.
109. See Ferrari, supranote 73, at 15.
110. Ferrari criticizes this feature of the Rome Convention. See id.at 15-16, 17.
111. Goode, supra note 19, at 7.
112. Article 65(b) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, as amended by the Treaty
of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1,now includes "promoting
the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the conflict of laws" among
the European Community's tasks. Concerning the potential consequences of this new provision for
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If the European Community's Council and Commission do embark on such a
project, one should certainly hope that commercial law experts will bring to their
attention the need to liberalize its provisions so as to authorize, in clear and unambiguous terms, individuals and enterprises to subject their agreements to nonnational rules. This would allow the parties to designate a legal order oriented to
the exigencies of international commercial transactions, which they may find preferable to opting for one of the parties' home-state law or a neutral legal system." 3
Such a choice is also likely to guarantee greater predictability than choice-of-law
rules possibly could. "4 Amending the terms ofthe Rome Convention in this fashion
would, at the same time, enable courts to resort to the UNIDROIT Principles for the
purpose of filling gaps in international conventions."'
Permitting the choice ofa non-national law such as the UNIDROIT Principles
would also alleviate the difficulties private parties and the courts encounter when
they are required to ascertain and apply a foreign law couched in an alien
terminology. Even if the rules of private international law were clear and precise,
which they are not for reasons already stated," 6 this daunting task inevitably
introduces uncertainty concerning the contracting parties' respective rights and
obligations. In contrast, the UNIDROIT Principles, readily accessible in any halfway decent law library, set forth the pertinent legal norms in reasonably clear and
cogent terms."' Nor do the Principles pose major interpretative difficulties to
monolingual counsel and judges: they are available not only in English, the lingua
Europe's private international law see Burkhard Hell, Die "Europfiisierung" des internationalen
Zivilprozessrechts durch den Amsterdamer ertrag-Chancen und Gefahren, 2000 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 23; Christian Kohler, Interrogation sur les sources de droit international privd
europden apris le traiti d°Amsterdam, 1999 Revue critique de droit international priv6 1; Thomas
Pfeiffer, Die Entwicklungdes Internationalen Vertrags-, Schuld- und Sachenrechts 1997-99, 1999
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3674.
113. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 107, at 659.
114. See Wichard, supra note 107, at 292.
115. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
116. See Juenger, supra note 18, at 157-59. Foreign law issues pose difficulties even within
regional organizations, such as the European Community, where an enormous volume ofcommercial
transactions moves freely across national borders. As has been observed:
legal counsels in the Member States are simply not qualified to give their clients precise
information on foreign contract law and the essential points in which it differs from
domestic law. Inpractice, legal advisers recommend choice of law clauses which almost
invariably refer the case to domestic law, and this advice is usually due to pure ignorance
ofalternative options offered by foreign legislation. Moreover, the adviser knows that, in
case of a dispute with his foreign counterpart, he will be in a superior negotiating
position ....
JOrgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, in The Unification of International Commercial Law, supranote 20, at4l,50. See also Boele-Woelki, supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. The rules are concise, clearly arranged and conveniently collected ... in a slim volume
of no more than 200 pages in length. The succinct wording, limpid comments and an
abundance ofexamples dealing with real-life situations are all designed for easy use....
The Principles are, as it were, presented on a silver platter.
Boele-Woelki, supranote 107, at 660.
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francaofour times, but have been translated into a variety ofother languages. As
is apparent, if the current version ofthe Rome Convention must indeed be construed
to restrict the parties' choice to positive national laws, it is sadly out ofdate and in
dire need of reform."
C. Choice-of-Law Conventions
Apart from their utility as a law to which individuals and enterprises may
subject their international dealings, the lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT
Principles can also play a role in choice-of-law statutes and conventions. When I
served as a member of*the U.S. delegation to the 1994 Fifth Inter-American
Specialized Conference of the Organization of American States (CIDIP-V) in
Mexico City, I proposed the inclusion of the following provision in the draft
of an Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts:
Ifthe parties have not selected the applicable law, or ifthis election proves
ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the general principles of
international
commercial law accepted by international organiza9
tions.''

As was to be expected, private international scholars took issue with this
proposal. However, owing to the support of the eminent Venezuelan conflicts
and international law scholar Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, who chaired the
pertinent committee, the Conference ultimately adopted the text now found
in the second paragraph of article 9 of the Inter-American Convention: 20
[The court, in addition to the wide range of objective and subject factors
specified in the first paragraph ofarticle 9] shall also take into account the
general principles of international commercial law recognized by
international organizations.
The wording of this provision, which mixes together traditional contacts with
substantive principles in eclectic fashion, is hardly ideal. 2' It does, however,
have the undeniable virtue of granting courts and arbitrators a leeway of
discretion that allows them to resort to the UNIDROIT Principles, rather
than some obscure and internationally unacceptable rule found in national
law. 122

118.
119.

See id. at 673-75, 677.
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-Imerican Conventionon theLawApplicable to International

Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 Am. J.Comp. L. 381, 391 (1994). This formula
was designed to refer to contract rules accepted by such bodies as UNIDROIT.
120. Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.K/XXI.5 (Mar. 17, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 732 (1994).
121. See Juenger, supra note 119, at 391.
122. See id.

1148

8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

D. Domestic Choice-of-Law Statutes
On a different occasion, I was asked to comment on the choice-of-law
provisions contained in a draft of the new Russian Civil Code. In addition to
questioning the draft's reliance on the traditional multilateral methodology and the
dysfunctional national law principle, 3 I offered a critique of various specific
articles and proposed an approach different from the drafters' contract choice-oflaw provisions.' As might have been expected, the draft-modeled on the Rome
Convention' 2S-used the "closest connection" formula and the "characteristic
performer" test, which, in addition to other deficiencies, accords unwarranted
choice-of-law privileges to parties habitually engaged in international commerce.' 6
I questioned the ability of Russian judges, new as they are to the private
international law business, to deal effectively with conflicts and foreign law issues
and pointed out that the "characteristic performer" test might not only
disadvantage Russian importers of goods and services but also invoke substandard
foreign contract rules. I therefore suggested to substitute the following
provision:
In the absence of an agreement of the parties on the applicable law, the
contract shall be governed by the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.
The UNIDROIT Principles were framed with the aid of representatives of the
former Soviet Union and have been translated into Russian. Obviously, construing
them presents fewer problems than the draft's convoluted conflicts rules. Even more
importantly, the Principles not only obviate the need to delve into foreign law but
also provide greater certainty and predictability than the recourse to traditional
multilateral choice-of-law rules and the attendant "General Part."' 27 My letter was
never answered, which goes to show that one should never underestimate the power
ofconventional conflicts wisdom.

123. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The National Law Principle,in 2 M61anges Fritz Sturm 1519
(1999).
124. See letter of Dec. 17, 1997, to Professor A. L. Makovsky, Private Law Research Centre,
Moscow; letter ofJune 1, 1998 to Dr. A. Zhiltsov, Head ofComparative and Private International Law
Research Center, Moscow (both on file with the author).
125. Article 1251, entitled "Choice of Law by Parties to a Contract," provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
I. In the absence of an agreement of the parties on the applicable law, the contract shall be

governed by the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected.
2. The law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected is, unless
otherwise follows from a statute, terms and the natur of the contract or the circumstances
of the case considered in their entirety, the law of the country where the place of residence
or the main place ofbusiness oftheparty whose performance is characteristic for the content
of the contract is located.
126. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Two EuropeanConflicts Conventions,28 Victoria U.Wellington
L. Rev. 527, 540 (1998).
127. See supranotes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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E. Creatinga Ius Commune by Means ofChoice-of-Law Rules
Although no positive private international law statutes have taken this path, it
is nevertheless possible (and certainly seems advisable) to incorporate the
UNIDROIT Principles into such enactments. There is, however, yet another
way in which private international law can promote the ends of international
commerce. No doubt, as far as transnational contracts are concerned, the
elaboration of a supranational substantive law is preferable to relying on
traditional private international law rules. But is the same not equally true
of other international transactions? If so, what if there is no quasicodification along the lines of the UNIDROIT Principles available to serve
as a set of norms in, say, tort cases? Might it not be possible to employ choice-oflaw approaches to create such a body of substantive international rules, a new ius
gentium that extends beyond the field of contracts? It is certainly not beyond the
8
realm ofpossibility to develop such a true "international private law"' by recourse
to conflicts methodology. In fact, as I pointed out on an earlier occasion, as long
as courts pursue a definite policy, even diverging choice-of-law approaches
can yield a similar assault, and thereby in effect create substantive rules of
decision.'29
There is also a more direct way of achieving this purpose: alternative reference
rules that favor a desired policy can help to create such an "international private
law." Rules of this kind are neither novel nor revolutionary; they have long been
used in practice. Perhaps the best example is the principle, which dates back to the
days of the statutists, that compliance with either the lex loci contractusor the lex
30
loci solutionisis sufficient to protect a contractagainst formal invalidity. Should
private international law not promote similar commonsensical solutions to the legal
problems of a world in which transactions fail to respect state and national
frontiers? Or are those of us who teach and write about private international law
condemned to debate forever the respective merits of the unilateralist and the
multilateralist methodologies? The time seems ripe to combine the conflictualist
with the internationalist approach. The contracts scholars who drafted the
Convention on the International Sales of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles have
rendered important contributions to international trade and commerce, as has the
3
work ofthose who compile lists ofinternational commercial contract rules. ' It now
behooves private international experts to do their part in creating the legal structures
needed in this age of unprecedented "globalization" because "legal scholars have
an important role to play in encouraging national courts to think internationally."'
As a German author put it, "the reevaluation of the relationship between an

128.

See Friedrich K. Juenger, Private InternationalLaw orInternationalPrivate Law?, 5 King's

College L.J.45 (1994-95).
129.

See id. at 60.

130.
131.
132.

See Juenger, supra note 18, at 178.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Goode, supra note 19, at 93. See also id. at xvii.
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autonomous international commercial law and national private law should be one
of the future tasks of private international law."'
This issue of the LouisianaLaw Review is dedicated to a good friend and
scholar of note. Our views diverge in many respects, but Symeon Symeonides is
one of the few American conflicts scholars who not only pay special attention to
international transactions but have also given the lex mercatoriasome thought. He
refers to the subject in his General Report to the XVth International Congress of
Comparative Law,"" and deals with it in the context of the cyberspace problem,
which he discusses in the last chapter of his conflicts casebook. 3 ' This should help
direct attention to an important development, which is somewhat neglected in
American conflicts literature, and educate the students who use that book to a
phenomenon ofconsiderable importance they are bound to encounter in practice.

133.
134.
135.

Karl Firsching & Bernd von Hoffmann, Intemationales Privatrecht 61 (5th ed. 1997).
See Symeonides, supra note 57, at 19-20.
See Symeonides et al., supra note 49, at 896-97.

